

ISLE OF ANGLESEY COUNTY COUNCIL		
REPORT TO:	EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE	
DATE:	19 DECEMBER 2016	
SUBJECT:	TREASURY MANAGEMENT MID-YEAR REVIEW REPORT 2016/17	
PORTFOLIO HOLDER(S):	COUNCILLOR H E JONES	
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LOCAL MEMBERS:	n/a	
A - Recommendation/s and reason/s		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To review the report to be consistent with professional guidance and to comply with the recommendations of the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management; • The report was scrutinised by the Audit Committee on 6 December 2016 who resolved to forward the report onto this committee without any comments; • To consider the content of the report and forward onto the County Council together with any comments. 		
B - What other options did you consider and why did you reject them and/or opt for this option?		
n/a		
C - Why is this decision for the Executive?		
To comply with the scheme of delegation, as set out in the Treasury Management Strategy Statement 2016/17, that was approved by this Council on 10 March 2016.		
CH - Is this decision consistent with policy approved by the full Council?		
Yes		
D - Is this decision within the budget approved by the Council?		
n/a		
DD - Who did you consult?		What did they say?
1	Chief Executive / Strategic Leadership Team (SLT) (mandatory)	
2	Finance / Section 151 (mandatory)	n/a – this is the Section151 Officer’s report
3	Legal / Monitoring Officer (mandatory)	
4	Human Resources (HR)	
5	Property	
6	Information Communication Technology (ICT)	
7	Scrutiny	
8	Local Members	
9	Any external bodies / other/s	

E - Risks and any mitigation (if relevant)		
1	Economic	
2	Anti-poverty	
3	Crime and Disorder	
4	Environmental	
5	Equalities	
6	Outcome Agreements	
7	Other	
F - Appendices:		
Annex A - Treasury Management Mid-Year Review Report 2016/17 Appendix 1 - Economic performance to date and outlook Appendix 2 - Commentary on the latest interest rates forecasts Appendix 3 - Capita Asset Services Forward View Appendix 4 - Borrowing and Investment Summary – Quarters 1 and 2 2016/17 Appendix 5 - Credit ratings of investment counterparties and deposits held with each as at 30 September 2016 Appendix 6 - Approved countries for investments		
FF - Background papers (please contact the author of the Report for any further information):		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2016/17 that was approved by this Council on 10 March 2016. 		

1. Introduction

The Council operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operations ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering optimising investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

Accordingly, treasury management is defined as:-

"The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

2. Background

The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

1. Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
2. Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
3. Receipt by the full Council of an Annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement, which includes the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy for the year ahead, a Mid-year Review Report (this report) and an Annual Report, covering activities during the previous year.
4. Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
5. Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit Committee.

This mid-year report has been prepared in compliance with CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management, and covers the following:-

- An economic update for the first part of the 2016/17 financial year;
- A review of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy;
- The Council's capital expenditure (prudential indicators);
- A review of the Council's investment portfolio for 2016/17;
- A review of the Council's borrowing strategy for 2016/17;
- A review of any debt rescheduling undertaken during 2016/17;
- A summary of activity since Quarter 2;
- A look ahead to next year; and
- A review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits for 2016/17.

3. Economic Update

3.1 The Council's treasury advisers provided a summary of the economic performance to date and outlook shortly after the end of the first quarter, and can be found in Appendix 1. They have also recently provided the following interest rate forecast:-

	Dec 2016	Mar 2017	Jun 2017	Sep 2017	Dec 2017	Mar 2018	Jun 2018
Bank Rate (%)	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
5yr PWLB rate (%)	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70
10yr PWLB rate (%)	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.30	2.40
25yr PWLB rate (%)	2.90	2.90	2.90	2.90	3.00	3.00	3.00
50yr PWLB rate (%)	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.70	2.80	2.80	2.80

3.2 The Council's treasury advisers recently provided a commentary alongside the interest rate forecast above. This commentary can be found in Appendix 2.

3.3 Following the reduction in the interest rate, the projected investment income is less than the budget for 2016/17.

4. Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy Update

4.1 The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2016/17 was approved by this Council on 10 March 2016. There are no policy changes to the TMSS; the details in this report update the position in the light of the updated economic position.

5. The Council's Capital Position (Prudential Indicators)

5.1 This part of the report is structured to update:-

- The Council's capital expenditure plans;
- How these plans are being financed;
- The impact of the changes in the capital expenditure plans on the prudential indicators and the underlying need to borrow; and
- Compliance with the limits in place for borrowing activity.

5.2 Prudential Indicator for Capital Expenditure

This table shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure in comparison to the capital budget.

Capital Expenditure	2016/17 Original Estimate £'000	Position as at 30 September 2016 £'000	2016/17 Current Estimate £'000
Council Fund	38,080	11,880	30,910
HRA	14,170	3,660	12,150
Total	52,250	15,540	43,060

5.2.1 The current estimate for capital expenditure is behind the original estimate mainly due to the Nanner Road Project coming in under the predicted cost and the online works are not as advanced as initially estimated, and the Holyhead & Llangefni Infrastructure still awaiting WEFO funding and it is not anticipated that any Capital Expenditure will be incurred this year. For a full breakdown on the Capital expenditure for 2016/17, please see the Capital Budget Monitoring Report that went to the Executive on 28 November 2016

5.3 Changes to the Financing of the Capital Programme

5.3.1 There are no significant changes to the financing of the capital programme to report at this stage.

5.3.2 The Table below shows the current estimate for the financing of the Capital Programme 2016/17 in comparison to the original forecast. The main difference relates to the funding for Capital Grants and Supported Borrowing, which is due to the funding arrangement of the 21st Century Schools programme for 2016/17. The Welsh Government funding is in the form of a Capital Grant and Supported Borrowing, and it was estimated that this would be split 50:50 in 2016/17. However, there is a greater weighting towards Supported Borrowing in 2016/17, meaning the Supported Borrowing has increased and Capital Grant has decreased. In future years it will be reversed with a greater weighting towards Capital Grant. This, along with the forecast under spend in the Holyhead & Llangefni Strategic Infrastructure and the forecast underspend in The New Highways to Wylfa Newydd, as previously stated, is the main reason the Capital Grant will be less in 2016/17.

Capital Financing	2016/17 Original Estimate £'000	2016/17 Revised Estimate £'000
Capital Grants	24,700	14,370
Capital Receipts	6,570	6,580
From Reserves	780	290
Revenue Contribution	10,680	8,940
Supported Borrowing	2,190	6,380
Unsupported Borrowing	6,730	5,900
Insurance	600	600
Total	52,250	43,060

5.4 Changes to the Prudential Indicators for the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), External Debt and the Operational Boundary

5.4.1 The table below shows the CFR, which is the underlying external need to incur borrowing for a capital purpose. It also shows the expected debt position over the period. This is termed the Operational Boundary.

5.4.2 Prudential Indicator – Capital Financing Requirement

5.4.2.1 We are on target to achieve the original forecast Capital Financing Requirement.

5.4.3 Prudential Indicator – External Debt/the Operational Boundary

	2016/17 Original Estimate £000	CFR Position at 30 September 2016 £000
Prudential Indicator – Capital Financing Requirement		
CFR – Council Fund	95,748	92,981
CFR – HRA	43,529	42,498
Total CFR	139,277	135,479
Net movement in CFR	9,099	7,823
	2016/17 Original Estimate £'000	Borrowing Position at 30 September 2016 £'000
Prudential Indicator – External Debt/the Operational Boundary		
Borrowing	161,000	110,739
Other long term liabilities	3,000	Nil
Total debt 31 March	164,000	110,739

5.5 Limits to Borrowing Activity

- 5.5.1** The first key control over the treasury activity is a prudential indicator to ensure that, over the medium term, net borrowing (borrowings less investments) will only be for a capital purpose. Gross external borrowing should not, except in the short term, exceed the total of CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2016/17 and the next two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years. The Council has approved a policy for borrowing in advance of need which will be adhered to if this proves prudent.

	2016/17 Original Estimate £'000	Position as at 30 September 2016 £'000
Gross borrowing	139,277	110,739
Plus other long term liabilities	Nil	Nil
Gross borrowing	139,277	110,739
CFR (year-end position)	139,277	n/a

- 5.5.2** It is not envisaged that there will be any difficulties for the current year in complying with this prudential indicator.

- 5.5.3** A further prudential indicator controls the overall level of borrowing. This is the Authorised Limit which represents the limit beyond which borrowing is prohibited, and needs to be set and revised by Members, currently £169m. It reflects the level of borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. It is the expected maximum borrowing need with some headroom for unexpected movements. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003.

Authorised limit for external debt	2016/17 Original Indicator	Current Borrowing Position as at 30 September 2016 £'000
Borrowing	166,000	110,739
Other long term liabilities	3,000	Nil
Total	169,000	110,739

6. Investment Portfolio 2016/17

- 6.1** In accordance with the Code, it is the Council's priority to ensure security of capital and liquidity, and to obtain an appropriate level of return which is consistent with the Council's risk appetite. As set out in Section 3, it is a very difficult investment market in terms of earning the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as rates are very low and in line with the current 0.25% Bank Rate. The continuing potential for a re-emergence of a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis together with other risks which could impact on the creditworthiness of banks, prompts a low risk strategy. Given this risk environment, investment returns are likely to remain low.
- 6.2** The Council held £14.6m of investments as at 30 September 2016 (£16.2m at 31 March 2016) and the investment portfolio yield for the first six months of the year was 0.35%. A full list of investments as at 30th September 2016 can be found in Appendix 5. A summary of the investments and rates can be found in Appendix 4.
- 6.3** The approved limits within the Annual Investment Strategy were not breached during the first six months of 2016/17.


- 6.4** The Council's budgeted investment return for 2016/17 is £0.150m and performance for the year to date is not in line with the budget, with only £0.037m received to the end of Quarter 2. Due to the interest rate reduction that occurred during the first half of the year, the budgeted £0.150m will not be met in 2016/17.
- 6.5** The current investment counterparty criteria selection approved in the TMSS is meeting the requirement of the treasury management function.
- 6.6** During the first six months of 2016/17, a fixed term investment matured from Nationwide Building Society for £5m on the 15 May 2016. This investment was rolled over with Nationwide Building Society for its full amount for a further three months to 16 August 2016 at a rate of 0.51%. Upon maturity at this date, the full amount was again rolled over with Nationwide Building Society for three months until 16 November 2016 at a rate of 0.28%.
- 6.7** During the first six months of 2016/17, the Isle of Anglesey County Council opened a deposit account with its main bank, National Westminster Bank plc. This deposit account is called Corporate Cash Manager, and the current interest rate on this account is 0.01%. This account will usually only be used when the balances on the other call accounts are at their maximum.

7. Borrowing

- 7.1** The projected capital financing requirement (CFR) for 2016/17 is £135.5m. The CFR denotes the Council's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. If the CFR is positive, the Council may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing). The balance of external and internal borrowing is generally driven by market conditions. The Council has projected year end borrowings of £110.7m and will have used £24.8m of cash flow funds in lieu of borrowing. This is a prudent and cost effective approach in the current economic climate but will require ongoing monitoring in the event that upside risk to gilt yields prevails.
- 7.2** No borrowing was undertaken during the first half of this financial year.
- 7.3** As shown in the graph below, the general trend to date has been a sharp fall in interest rates in the current financial year. The graph and table below show the movement in PWLB certainty rates (which is when the government has reduced by 20 basis points 20 (0.20%) the interest rates on loans to principal local authorities (including the Isle of Anglesey County Council) who provide information as required on their plans for long-term borrowing and associated capital spending) for the first six months of the year to date:-

PWLB certainty rates 1 April 2016 to 30th September 2016

	1 Year	5 Year	10 Year	25 Year	50 Year
1/4/16	1.13%	1.62%	2.31%	3.14%	2.95%
30/9/16	0.83%	1.01%	1.26%	1.41%	1.66%
Low	0.81%	0.95%	1.42%	2.08%	1.87%
Date	07/09/2016	10/08/2016	10/08/2016	12/08/2016	30/08/2016
High	1.20%	1.80%	2.51%	3.28%	3.08%
Date	27/04/2016	27/04/2016	27/04/2016	27/04/2016	27/04/2016
Average	0.99%	1.33%	1.92%	2.69%	2.46%



8. Debt Rescheduling

8.1 Debt rescheduling opportunities have been very limited in the current economic climate given the consequent structure of interest rates, and following the increase in the margin added to gilt yields which has impacted PWLB new borrowing rates since October 2010. No debt rescheduling has therefore been undertaken to date in the current financial year. An exercise was undertaken to determine if it would be worthwhile to reschedule some of the debt, however, it would not be cost effective as a premium charge will occur on all premature repayment of loan which is greater than the savings in interest payments that would be achieved.

9. Activity since Quarter

9.1 In addition to the normal transfers between call accounts designed to maximize Investment Income, since Quarter 2 the fixed term investment made with Nationwide Building Society (mentioned in section 6.6) for £5m at a rate of 0.28% matured on 16/11/16. This investment was not rolled over and was repaid to the Isle of Anglesey County Council. Since the end of the quarter, there has been a further investment made for £5m with Aberdeen City Council. The duration of this investment is 2 months from 18/10/16 to 16/12/16 at a rate of 0.22%.

10. Plans for next year

10.1 At its next meeting in February, this Committee will consider the plans for borrowing for the next financial year. The initial plans, according to the draft Capital Programme for 2017/18 are:-

- to use the required sum from the available general supported borrowing allocation of £2.203m, and £1.269m of specific supported borrowing for the 21st century schools programme; and
- to borrow £0.653m on an unsupported basis for the general fund capital schemes and £4.326m on the 21st century schools programme.

11. Recommendation

11.1 To consider the content of the report and forward any comments onto the Full Council.

Perfformiad Economaidd hyd yma a'r rhagolygiad/ Economic performance to date and outlook**1. United Kingdom**

GDP growth rates in 2013, 2014 and 2015 of 2.2%, 2.9% and 1.8% were some of the strongest rates among the G7 countries. Growth is expected to have strengthened in 2016 with the first three quarters coming in respectively at +0.4%, +0.7% and +0.5%. The latest Bank of England forecast for growth in 2016 as a whole is +2.2%. The figure for quarter 3 was a pleasant surprise which confounded the downbeat forecast by the Bank of England in August of only +0.1%, (subsequently revised up in September, but only to +0.2%). During most of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the economy had faced headwinds for exporters from the appreciation of sterling against the Euro, and weak growth in the EU, China and emerging markets, and from the dampening effect of the Government's continuing austerity programme.

The referendum vote for Brexit in June 2016 delivered an immediate shock fall in confidence indicators and business surveys at the beginning of August, which were interpreted by the Bank of England in its August Inflation Report as pointing to an impending sharp slowdown in the economy. However, the following monthly surveys in September showed an equally sharp recovery in confidence and business surveys so that it is generally expected that the economy will post reasonably strong growth numbers through the second half of 2016 and also in 2017, albeit at a slower pace than in the first half of 2016.

The Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), meeting of 4th August was therefore dominated by countering this expected sharp slowdown and resulted in a package of measures that included a cut in Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, a renewal of quantitative easing, with £70bn made available for purchases of gilts and corporate bonds, and a £100bn tranche of cheap borrowing being made available for banks to use to lend to businesses and individuals.

The MPC meeting of 3 November left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.25% and other monetary policy measures also remained unchanged. This was in line with market expectations, but a major change from the previous quarterly Inflation Report MPC meeting of 4 August, which had given a strong steer, in its forward guidance, that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again, probably by the end of the year if economic data turned out as forecast by the Bank.

The latest MPC decision included a forward view that Bank Rate could go either up or down depending on how economic data evolves in the coming months. Our central view remains that Bank Rate will remain unchanged at 0.25% until the first increase to 0.50% in quarter 2 2019 (unchanged from our previous forecast). However, we would not, as yet, discount the risk of a cut in Bank Rate if economic growth were to take a significant dip downwards, though we think this is unlikely. We would also point out that forecasting as far ahead as mid 2019 is highly fraught as there are many potential economic headwinds which could blow the UK economy one way or the other as well as political developments in the UK, (especially over the terms of Brexit), EU, US and beyond, which could have a major impact on our forecasts.

The pace of Bank Rate increases in our forecasts has been slightly increased beyond the three year time horizon to reflect higher inflation expectations.

The August quarterly Inflation Report was based on a pessimistic forecast of near to zero GDP growth in quarter 3 i.e. a sharp slowdown in growth from +0.7% in quarter 2, in reaction to the shock of the result of the referendum in June. However, consumers have very much stayed in a 'business as usual' mode and there has been no sharp downturn in spending; it is consumer expenditure that underpins the services sector which comprises about 75% of UK GDP. After a fairly flat three months leading up to October, retail sales in October surged at the strongest rate since September 2015. In addition, the GfK consumer confidence index has recovered quite strongly to -3 in October after an initial sharp plunge in July to -12 in reaction to the referendum result.

Bank of England GDP forecasts in the November quarterly Inflation Report were as follows, (August forecasts in brackets) - 2016 +2.2%, (+2.0%); 2017 1.4%, (+0.8%); 2018 +1.5%, (+1.8%). There has, therefore, been a sharp increase in the forecast for 2017, a marginal increase in 2016 and a small decline in growth, now being delayed until 2018, as a result of the impact of Brexit.

Capital Economics' GDP forecasts are as follows: 2016 +2.0%; 2017 +1.5%; 2018 +2.5%. They feel that pessimism is still being overdone by the Bank and Brexit will not have as big an effect as initially feared by some commentators.

The Chancellor has said he will do 'whatever is needed' i.e. to promote growth; there are two main options he can follow – fiscal policy e.g. cut taxes, increase investment allowances for businesses, and/or increase government expenditure on infrastructure, housing etc. This will mean that the PSBR deficit elimination timetable will need to slip further into the future as promoting growth, (and ultimately boosting tax revenues in the longer term), will be a more urgent priority. The Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, had warned that a vote for Brexit would be likely to cause a slowing in growth, particularly from a reduction in business investment, due to the uncertainty of whether the UK would have continuing full access, (i.e. without tariffs), to the EU single market. He also warned that the Bank could not do all the heavy lifting to boost economic growth and suggested that the Government would need to help growth e.g. by increasing investment expenditure and by using fiscal policy tools. The newly appointed Chancellor, Phillip Hammond, announced, in the aftermath of the referendum result and the formation of a new Conservative cabinet, that the target of achieving a budget surplus in 2020 would be eased in the Autumn Statement on 23 November.

The other key factor in forecasts for Bank Rate is inflation where the MPC aims for a target for CPI of 2.0%. The November Inflation Report included an increase in the peak forecast for inflation from 2.3% to 2.7% during 2017; (Capital Economics are forecasting a peak of 3.2% in 2018). This increase was largely due to the effect of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since the referendum, (16% down against the US dollar and 11% down against the Euro); this will feed through into a sharp increase in the cost of imports and materials used in production in the UK. However, the MPC is expected to look through the acceleration in inflation caused by external, (outside of the UK), influences, although it has given a clear warning that if wage inflation were to rise significantly as a result of these cost pressures on consumers, then they would take action to raise Bank Rate.

What is clear is that consumer disposable income will come under pressure, as the latest employers' survey is forecasting median pay rises for the year ahead of only 1.1% at a time when inflation will be rising significantly higher than this. The CPI figure for October surprised by under shooting forecasts at 0.9%. However, producer output prices rose at 2.1% and core inflation was up at 1.4%, confirming the likely future upwards path.

Gilt yields, and consequently PwLB rates, have risen sharply since hitting a low point in mid-August. There has also been huge volatility during 2016 as a whole. The year started with 10 year gilt yields at 1.88%, fell to a low point of 0.53% on 12 August, and have hit a peak on the way up again of 1.46% on 14 November. The rebound since August reflects the initial combination of the yield-depressing effect of the MPC's new round of quantitative easing on 4 August, together with expectations of a sharp downturn in expectations for growth and inflation as per the pessimistic Bank of England Inflation Report forecast, followed by a sharp rise in growth expectations since August when subsequent business surveys, and GDP growth in quarter 3 at +0.5% q/q, confounded the pessimism. Inflation expectations also rose sharply as a result of the continuing fall in the value of sterling.

Employment has been growing steadily during 2016, despite initial expectations that the referendum would cause a fall in employment. However, the latest employment data in November, (for October), showed a distinct slowdown in the rate of employment growth and an increase in the rate of growth of the unemployment claimant count. House prices have been rising during 2016 at a modest pace but the pace of increase has been slowing since the referendum; a downturn in prices could dampen consumer confidence and expenditure.

2. United States of America

The American economy had a patchy 2015 with sharp swings in the quarterly growth rate leaving the overall growth for the year at 2.4%. Quarter 1 of 2016 at +0.8%, (on an annualised basis), and quarter 2 at 1.4% left average growth for the first half at a weak 1.1%. However, the first estimate for quarter 3 at 2.9% signalled a rebound to strong growth. The Fed. embarked on its long anticipated first increase in rates at its December 2015 meeting. At that point, confidence was high that there would then be four more increases to come in 2016. Since then, more downbeat news on the international scene and then the Brexit vote, have caused a delay in the timing of the second increase which is now strongly expected in December 2016. Overall, despite some data setbacks, the US is still, probably, the best positioned of the major world economies to make solid progress towards a combination of strong growth, full employment and rising inflation: this is going to require the central bank to take action to raise rates so as to make progress towards normalisation of monetary policy, albeit at lower central rates than prevailed before the 2008 crisis.

The result of the presidential election in November is expected to lead to a strengthening of US growth if Trump's election promise of a major increase in expenditure on infrastructure is implemented. This policy is also likely to strengthen inflation pressures as the economy is already working at near full capacity. In addition, the unemployment rate is at a low point verging on what is normally classified as being full employment. However, the US does have a substantial amount of hidden unemployment in terms of an unusually large, (for a developed economy), percentage of the working population not actively seeking employment.

Trump's election has had a profound effect on the bond market and bond yields have risen sharply in the week since his election. Time will tell if this is a temporary over reaction, or a reasonable assessment of his election promises to cut taxes at the same time as boosting expenditure. This could lead to a sharp rise in total debt issuance from the current level of around 72% of GDP towards 100% during his term in office. However, although the Republicans now have a monopoly of power for the first time since the 1920s, in having a President and a majority in both Congress and the Senate, there is by no means any certainty that the politicians and advisers he has been appointing to his team, and both houses, will implement the more extreme policies that Trump outlined during his election campaign. Indeed, Trump may even rein back on some of those policies himself.

The election does not appear likely to have much impact on the Fed. in terms of holding back further on increasing the Fed. Rate. Accordingly, the next rate rise is still widely expected to occur in December 2016, followed by sharper increases thereafter, which may also cause Treasury yields to rise further. If the Trump package of policies is fully implemented, there is likely to be a significant increase in inflationary pressures which could, in turn, mean that the pace of further Fed. Rate increases will be quicker and stronger than had been previously expected.

In the first week since the US election, there has been a major shift in investor sentiment away from bonds to equities, especially in the US. However, gilt yields in the UK and bond yields in the EU have also been dragged higher. Some commentators are saying that this rise has been an overreaction to the US election result which is likely to be reversed. Other commentators take the view that this could well be the start of the long expected eventual unwinding of bond prices propelled upwards to unrealistically high levels, (and conversely bond yields pushed down), by the artificial and temporary power of quantitative easing.

3. Eurozone

In the Eurozone, the ECB commenced, in March 2015, its massive €1.1 trillion programme of quantitative easing to buy high credit quality government and other debt of selected EZ countries at a rate of €60bn per month. This was intended to run initially to September 2016 but was extended to March 2017 at its December 2015 meeting. At its December and March 2016 meetings it progressively cut its deposit facility rate to reach -0.4% and its main refinancing rate from 0.05% to zero. At its March meeting, it also increased its monthly asset purchases to €80bn. These measures have struggled to make a significant impact in boosting economic growth and in helping inflation to rise significantly from low levels towards the target of 2%.

EZ GDP growth in the first three quarters of 2016 has been 0.5%, +0.3% and +0.3%, (+1.6% y/y). Forward indications are that economic growth in the EU is likely to continue at moderate levels. This has added to comments from many forecasters that those central banks in countries around the world which are currently struggling to combat low growth, are running out of ammunition to stimulate growth and to boost inflation. Central banks have also been stressing that national governments will need to do more by way of structural reforms, fiscal measures and direct investment expenditure to support demand and economic growth in their economies.

There are also significant specific political and other risks within the EZ: -

- Greece continues to cause major stress in the EU due to its tardiness and reluctance in implementing key reforms required by the EU to make the country more efficient and to make significant progress towards the country being able to pay its way – and before the EU is prepared to agree to release further bail out funds.
- Spain has had two inconclusive general elections in 2015 and 2016, both of which failed to produce a workable government with a majority of the 350 seats. At the eleventh hour on 31 October, before it would have become compulsory to call a third general election, the party with the biggest bloc of seats (137), was given a majority confidence vote to form a government. This is potentially a highly unstable situation, particularly given the need to deal with an EU demand for implementation of a package of austerity cuts which will be highly unpopular.
- The under capitalisation of Italian banks poses a major risk. Some German banks are also undercapitalised, especially Deutsche Bank, which is under threat of major financial penalties from regulatory authorities that will further weaken its capitalisation. What is clear is that national governments are forbidden by EU rules from providing state aid to bail out those banks that are at risk, while, at the same time, those banks are unable realistically to borrow additional capital in financial markets due to their vulnerable financial state. However, they are also 'too big, and too important to their national economies, to be allowed to fail'.
- 4 December Italian constitutional referendum on reforming the Senate and reducing its powers; this has also become a confidence vote on Prime Minister Renzi who originally said he would resign if there is a 'no' vote, but has since back tracked on that in the light of adverse poll predictions. A rejection of these proposals would stop progress to fundamental political and economic reform which is urgently needed to deal with Italy's core problems, especially low growth and a very high debt to GDP ratio of 135%. They are also intended to give Italy more stable government as no western European country has had such a multiplicity of governments since the Second World War as Italy, due to the equal split of power between the two chambers of the Parliament which are both voted in by the Italian electorate but by using different voting systems. It is unclear what the political, and other, repercussions could be if there is a 'No' vote.
- Dutch general election 15.3.17; a far right party is currently polling neck and neck with the incumbent ruling party. In addition, anti-big business and anti-EU activists have already collected two thirds of the 300,000 signatures required to force a referendum to be taken on approving the EU – Canada free trade pact. This could delay the pact until a referendum in 2018 which would require unanimous approval by all EU governments before it can be finalised. In April 2016, Dutch voters rejected by 61.1% an EU – Ukraine cooperation pact under the same referendum law. Dutch activists are concerned by the lack of democracy in the institutions of the EU.

- French presidential election; first round 13 April; second round 7 May 2017.
- French National Assembly election June 2017.
- German Federal election August – 22 October 2017. This could be affected by significant shifts in voter intentions as a result of terrorist attacks, dealing with a huge influx of immigrants and a rise in anti EU sentiment.
- The core EU, (note, not just the Eurozone currency area), principle of free movement of people within the EU is a growing issue leading to major stress and tension between EU states, especially with the Visegrad bloc of former communist states.

Given the number and type of challenges the EU faces in the next eighteen months, there is an identifiable risk for the EU project to be called into fundamental question. The risk of an electoral revolt against the EU establishment has gained traction after the shock results of the UK referendum and the US Presidential election. But it remains to be seen whether any shift in sentiment will gain sufficient traction to produce any further shocks within the EU.

4. **Asia**

Economic growth in China has been slowing down and this, in turn, has been denting economic growth in emerging market countries dependent on exporting raw materials to China. Medium term risks have been increasing in China e.g. a dangerous build up in the level of credit compared to the size of GDP, plus there is a need to address a major over supply of housing and surplus industrial capacity, which both need to be eliminated. This needs to be combined with a rebalancing of the economy from investment expenditure to consumer spending. However, the central bank has a track record of supporting growth through various monetary policy measures, though these further stimulate the growth of credit risks and so increase the existing major imbalances within the economy.

Economic growth in Japan is still patchy, at best, and skirting with deflation, despite successive rounds of huge monetary stimulus and massive fiscal action to promote consumer spending. The government is also making little progress on fundamental reforms of the economy.

5. **Emerging countries**

There have been major concerns around the vulnerability of some emerging countries exposed to the downturn in demand for commodities from China or to competition from the increase in supply of American shale oil and gas reaching world markets. The ending of sanctions on Iran has also brought a further significant increase in oil supplies into the world markets. While these concerns have subsided during 2016, if interest rates in the USA do rise substantially over the next few years, (and this could also be accompanied by a rise in the value of the dollar in exchange markets), this could cause significant problems for those emerging countries with large amounts of debt denominated in dollars. The Bank of International Settlements has recently released a report that \$340bn of emerging market corporate debt will fall due for repayment in the remaining two months of 2016 and in 2017 – a 40% increase on the figure for the last three years.

Financial markets could also be vulnerable to risks from those emerging countries with major sovereign wealth funds, that are highly exposed to the falls in commodity prices from the levels prevailing before 2015, especially oil, and which, therefore, may have to liquidate substantial amounts of investments in order to cover national budget deficits over the next few years if the price of oil does not return to pre-2015 levels.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. This period can be extended with the agreement of all members i.e. not that likely.
- UK continues as an EU member during this two-year period with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.

- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK may also exit without any such agreements.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.
- It is possible that some sort of agreement could be reached for a transitional time period for actually implementing Brexit after March 2019 so as to help exporters to adjust in both the EU and in the UK.

Sylwadau ar y rhagolygon diweddaraf ar raddfeydd llog/Commentary on the latest interest rates forecasts

We have updated our forecasts of 9 August to take into account the Bank of England quarterly Inflation Report for November 2016, the decision of the MPC meeting of 3 November, and the US Presidential election of 8 November. We also felt that we should allow financial markets to settle down for a few days after the result of that election, which provided a surprise outcome. We therefore undertook a review of our forecasts on 15 November.

Despite many ominous warnings that there could be significant turbulence in financial markets if Donald Trump won the election, markets have surprised by their lack of such a reaction. In fact, stock markets in America have hit a new record high in the first few days since the election. However, Treasury yields have risen sharply in expectation of a significant rise in inflation, as an economy which is already working near to full capacity could be in line for a significant boost to economic growth if Trump's expansion of infrastructure expenditure plans become a reality.

His plans to cut taxes, at the same time as boosting expenditure, could also lead to a sharp rise in total debt issuance from the current level of around 72% of GDP towards 100% during his term in office. However, although the Republicans now have a monopoly of power for the first time since the 1920s, in having a President and a majority in both Congress and the Senate, there is by no means any certainty that the politicians and advisers he has been appointing to his team, and both houses, will implement the more extreme policies that Trump outlined during his election campaign. Indeed, Trump may even rein back on some of those policies himself.

The MPC meeting of 3 November left Bank Rate unchanged at 0.25% and other monetary policy measures also remained unaltered. This was in line with market expectations, but a major change from the previous quarterly Inflation Report MPC meeting of 4 August, which had given a strong steer in its forward guidance that it was likely to cut Bank Rate again, probably by the end of the year if economic data turned out as forecast by the Bank.

The latest MPC decision included a forward view that Bank Rate could go either up or down depending on how economic data evolve in the coming months. Our central view remains that Bank Rate will remain unchanged at 0.25% until the first increase to 0.50% in June 2019 (unchanged from our previous forecast). However, we would not, as yet, discount the risk of a cut in Bank Rate if economic growth were to take a significant dip downwards, though we think this is unlikely. We would also point out that forecasting as far ahead as mid 2019 is highly fraught as there are many potential economic headwinds which could blow the UK economy one way or the other as well as political developments in the UK, (especially over the terms of Brexit), EU, US and beyond, which could have a major impact on our forecasts.

The pace of Bank Rate increases in our forecasts has been slightly increased beyond the three year time horizon to reflect higher inflation expectations.

The August quarterly Inflation Report was based on a pessimistic forecast of near to zero GDP growth in quarter 3 i.e. a sharp slowdown in growth from +0.7% in quarter 2, in reaction to the shock of the result of the referendum in June. However, consumers have very much stayed in a 'business as usual' mode and there has been no sharp downturn in spending; it is consumer expenditure that underpins the services sector which comprises about 75% of UK GDP. After a fairly flat three months leading up to October, retail sales in October surged at the strongest rate since September 2015. In addition, the GfK consumer confidence index has recovered quite strongly to -3 in October after an initial sharp plunge in July to -12 in reaction to the referendum result.

Bank of England GDP forecasts in the November quarterly Inflation Report were as follows, (August forecasts in brackets) - 2016 +2.2%, (+2.0%); 2017 1.4%, (+0.8%); 2018 +1.5%, (+1.8%). There has, therefore, been a sharp increase in the forecast for 2017, a marginal increase in 2016 and a small decline in growth, now being delayed until 2018, as a result of the impact of Brexit.

Capital Economics' forecasts for economic growth are as follows: 2016 +2.0%; 2017 +1.5%; 2018 +2.5%. They feel that pessimism is still being overdone by the Bank and Brexit will not have as big an effect as initially feared by some commentators.

The other key factor in forecasts for Bank Rate is inflation where the MPC aims for a target for CPI of 2.0%. The November Inflation Report included an increase in the peak forecast for inflation from 2.3% to 2.7% during 2017; (Capital Economics are forecasting a peak of 3.2% in 2018). This increase was largely due to the effect of the sharp fall in the value of sterling since the referendum, (16% down against the US dollar and 11% down against the Euro); this will feed through into a sharp increase in the cost of imports and materials used in production in the UK. However, the MPC is expected to look through the acceleration in inflation caused by external, (outside of the UK), influences, although it has given a clear warning that if wage inflation were to rise significantly as a result of these cost pressures on consumers, then they would take action to raise Bank Rate.

What is clear is that consumer disposable income will come under pressure, as the latest employers' survey is forecasting median pay rises for the year ahead of only 1.1% at a time when inflation will be rising significantly higher than this. The CPI figure for October surprised by under shooting forecasts at 0.9%. However, producer output prices rose at 2.1% and core inflation was up at 1.4%, confirming the likely future upwards path.

Gilt yields, and consequently PWLB rates, have risen sharply since hitting a low point in mid-August. There has also been huge volatility during 2016 as a whole. The year started with 10 year gilt yields at 1.88%, fell to a low point of 0.53% on 12 August, and have hit a peak on the way up again of 1.46% on 14 November. The rebound since August reflects the initial combination of the yield-depressing effect of the MPC's new round of quantitative easing on 4 August, together with expectations of a sharp downturn in expectations for growth and inflation as per the pessimistic Bank of England Inflation Report forecast, followed by a sharp rise in growth expectations since August when subsequent business surveys, and GDP growth in quarter 3 at +0.5% q/q, confounded the pessimism. Inflation expectations also rose sharply as a result of the continuing fall in the value of sterling.

The Chancellor has said he will do 'whatever is needed' i.e. to promote growth; there are two main options he can follow – fiscal policy e.g. cut taxes, increase investment allowances for businesses and/or increase government expenditure on infrastructure, housing etc. This will mean that the PSBR deficit elimination timetable will need to slip further into the future as promoting growth, (and ultimately boosting tax revenues in the longer term), will be a more urgent priority.

Employment has been continuing to grow steadily, despite initial expectations that the referendum would cause a fall in employment. House prices are also continuing to rise at a modest pace; but a downturn in prices could dampen consumer confidence and expenditure.

Rising EU and geopolitical risks e.g.

- Greece continues to cause major stress in the EU due to its tardiness and reluctance in implementing key reforms required by the EU to make the country more efficient and to make significant progress towards the country being able to pay its way – and before the EU is prepared to agree to release further bail out funds.
- Spain has had two general elections in 2015 and 2016, both of which failed to produce a workable government with a majority of the 350 seats. At the eleventh hour on 31 October, before it would have become compulsory to call a third general election, the party with the biggest bloc of seats (130), was given a majority confidence vote to form a government. This is potentially a highly unstable situation, particularly given the need to deal with an EU demand for implementation of a package of austerity cuts which will be highly unpopular.
- The under capitalisation of Italian banks poses a major risk with state aid firmly ruled out by the EU as a potential way out.

- 4 December Italian constitutional referendum on reforming the Senate and reducing its powers; this has also become a confidence vote on Prime Minister Renzi who originally said he would resign if there is a 'no' vote, but has since back tracked on that in the light of adverse poll predictions. A rejection of these proposals would stop progress to fundamental political and economic reform which is urgently needed to deal with Italy's core problems, especially low growth. They are also intended to give Italy more stable government as no western European country has had such a multiplicity of governments since the Second World War as Italy, due to the equal split of power between the two chambers of the Parliament which are both voted in by the Italian electorate but by using different voting systems. It is unclear if a No vote could bring down the government.
- Dutch general election 15.3.17; a far right party is currently polling neck and neck with the incumbent ruling party. In addition, anti-big business and anti-EU activists have already collected two thirds of the 300,000 signatures required to force a referendum to be taken on approving the EU – Canada free trade pact. This could delay the pact until a referendum in 2018 which would require unanimous approval by all EU governments before it can be finalised. In April 2016, Dutch voters rejected by 61.1% an EU – Ukraine cooperation pact under the same referendum law. Dutch activists are concerned by the lack of democracy in the institutions of the EU.
- French presidential election; first round 13 April; second round 7 May 2017.
- French National Assembly election June 2017.

German Federal election August – 22 October 2017. This could be affected by significant shifts in voter intentions as a result of terrorist attacks, dealing with a huge influx of immigrants and a rise in anti EU sentiment.

The core EU, (note, not just the Eurozone currency area), principle of free movement of people within the EU is a growing issue leading to major stress and tension between EU states, especially with the Visegrad bloc of former communist states.

Given the number and type of challenges the EU faces in the next eighteen months, there is an identifiable risk for the EU project to be called into fundamental question. The risk of an electoral revolt against the EU establishment has gained traction after the shock results of the UK referendum and the US Presidential election. But it remains to be seen whether any shift in sentiment will gain sufficient traction to produce any further shocks.

Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), has been lack lustre despite the ECB cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of quantitative easing during 2016. Growth could be negatively impacted by political developments which would then also impact on UK exports and growth.

The US economy has been growing strongly in quarter three at 2.9%, (on an annualised basis), after only 1.4% in quarter 2. The election does not appear likely to have much impact on the Fed. in terms of holding back further on increasing the Fed. Rate. Accordingly, the next rate rise is still widely expected to occur in December 2016, followed by sharper increases thereafter, which may also cause Treasury yields to rise further; this could give rise to a growing gap between Treasury and gilt yields over time. If the Trump package of policies is implemented, there is likely to be an increase in inflationary pressures which could then mean that the pace of further Fed. Rate increases will be quicker and stronger than formerly expected.

In the first week since the US election, there has already been a major shift in investor sentiment away from bonds to equities, especially in the US. However, gilt yields and bond yields in the EU have also been dragged higher. Some commentators are saying that this rise has been an overreaction to the US election result which is likely to be reversed. Other commentators take the view that this could well be the start of the long expected eventual unwinding of bond prices propelled upwards to unrealistically high levels by the artificial and temporary power of quantitative easing.

Japan is struggling to gain consistent significant growth, although quarter 3 has come in at +2.2%, (annualised rate). It is also struggling to put deflation firmly behind it and to get inflation up to reasonable levels, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy

Chinese economic growth has been weakening despite successive rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

Edrych i'r Dyfodol gan Capita Asset Services/ Capita Asset Services Forward View

Economic forecasting remains difficult with so many external influences weighing on the UK. Our Bank Rate forecasts, (and also MPC decisions), will be liable to further amendment depending on how economic data and developments in financial markets transpire over the next year. Forecasts for average earnings beyond the three year time horizon will be heavily dependent on economic and political developments. Major volatility in bond yields is likely to endure as investor fears and confidence ebb and flow between favouring more risky assets i.e. equities, or the safe haven of bonds.

The overall longer run trend is for gilt yields and PWLB rates to rise, albeit gently. An eventual world economic recovery may also see investors switching from the safe haven of bonds to equities.

We have pointed out consistently that the Fed. Rate is likely to go up more quickly and more strongly than Bank Rate in the UK and recent events have not changed that view, just that the timing of such increases may well have been deferred somewhat during 2016. While there is normally a high degree of correlation between the two yields, we would expect to see a growing decoupling of yields between the two i.e. we would expect US yields to go up faster than UK yields. We will need to monitor this area closely and the resulting effect on PWLB rates.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK remains to the downside, particularly with the current uncertainty over the final terms of Brexit.

We would, as always, remind clients of the view that we have expressed in our previous interest rate revision newflashes of just how unpredictable PWLB rates and bond yields are at present. We are experiencing exceptional levels of volatility which are highly correlated to geo-political and sovereign debt crisis developments. Our revised forecasts are based on the Certainty Rate (minus 20 bps) which has been accessible to most authorities since 1st November 2012.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:-

- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.
- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth and combat the threat of deflation in western economies, especially the Eurozone and Japan.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. funds rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels than in the wider EU and US, causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

Borrowing advice: although yields have risen from their low points, yields are still at historic lows and borrowing should be considered if appropriate to your strategy. We still see value in the 40yr to 50yr range at present but that view would be negated if Bank Rate does not climb to at least 2.5% over the coming years. Accordingly, clients will need to review and assess their risk appetite in terms of any underlying borrowing requirement they may have, and also project forward their position in respect of cash backed resources.

Any new borrowing should also take into account the continuing cost of carry, the difference between investment earnings and borrowing rates, especially as our forecasts indicate that Bank Rate may not rise from 0.25% until June 2019 and then will only rise slowly.

As there are so many variables at this time, caution must be exercised in respect of all interest rate forecasts. The general expectation for an eventual trend of gently rising gilt yields and PWLB rates is expected to remain unchanged. Negative, (or positive), developments could significantly impact safe-haven flows of investor money into UK, US and German bonds and produce shorter term movements away from our central forecasts.

Our interest rate forecast for Bank Rate is in steps of 25 bps whereas PWLB forecasts have been rounded to the nearest 10 bps and are central forecasts within bands of + / - 25 bps.

Crynodeb Benthycyca a Buddsoddi – Chwarteroedd 1 a 2 2016/17
Borrowing and Investment Summary – Quarters 1 and 2 2016/17

	30 Medi / Sept 2016		30 Mehefin / June 2016	
	£m	% (paid on borrowing and received on investment)	£m	% (paid on borrowing and received on investment)
Benthycyca – graddfa sefydlog Borrowing – fixed rate	110.7	5.42	110.7	5.42
Benthycyca – graddfa amrywiol Borrowing – variable rate	Dim / Nil	d/b / n/a	Dim / Nil	d/b / n/a
Adneuon – galw hyd at 30 diwrnod Deposits – Call to 30 days	9.6	0.14	14.8	0.39
Adneuon – Tymor sefydlog < 1 bl. Deposits – Fixed Term < 1 year	5.0	0.28	5.0	0.51
Adneuon – Tymor sefydlog 1 bl. + Deposits – Fixed Term 1 year +	Dim / Nil	d/b / n/a	Dim / Nil	d/b / n/a
Cyfanswm Adneuon Total Deposits	14.6	0.18	19.8	0.42
Cyfartaledd Adneuon yn y Chwarter Highest Deposits in the Quarter	24.8	d/b / n/a	29.7	d/b / n/a
Cyfartaledd Adneuon yn y Chwarter Lowest Deposits in the Quarter	14.6	d/b / n/a	16.4	d/b / n/a
Cyfartaledd Adneuon yn y Chwarter Average Deposits in the Quarter	22.4	0.35	23.3	0.39

Ni torwyd unrhyw un o'r dangosyddion trysorlys yn ystod hanner cyntaf y flwyddyn.
None of the treasury indicators were breached during the first half of the year.

Graddfeydd Credyd Gwrthbartion buddsoddi a'r adneuron a ddelir gyda phob un ar 30 Medi 2016*
Credit ratings of investment counterparties and deposits held with each as at 30 September 2016*

Grŵp Bancio/ Banking Group	Sefydliad/ Institution	Adneuron/ Deposit £'000	Hyd (Galw tymor sefydlog) / Duration (Call / Fixed Term**)	Cyfnod (O/I)/ Period (From / To)	Graddfa Dychweliad/ Rate of Return %	Graddfa Tymor Hir Fitch Long Term Rating	Graddfa Tymor Byr Fitch Short Term Rating	Graddfa Tymor Hir Moody's Long Term Rating	Graddfa Tymor Byr Moody's Short Term Rating	Graddfa Tymor Hir Standard & Poor's (S&P) Long Term Rating	Graddfa Tymor Byr Standard & Poor's (S&P) Short Term Rating	Lliw Sector/Hyd Awgrymedig/ Sector Colour / Suggested Duration
Lloyds Banking Group plc	Bank of Scotland plc	2,097	Galw/ Call	n/a	0.15	A+	F1	A1	P-1	A	A-1	Coch - 6 mis/ Red - 6 months
HSBC Holdings plc	HSBC Bank plc	0	Galw/ Call	n/a	0.01	AA-	F1+	Aa2	P-1	AA-	A-1+	Oren – 12 mis / Orange – 12 months
Santander Group plc	Santander UK plc	6,527	Galw/ Call	n/a	0.15	A	F1	Aa3	P-1	A	A-1	Coch – 6 mis/ Red - 6 months
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc	The Royal Bank of Scotland plc	1	Galw/ Call	n/a	0.10	BBB+	F2	A3	P-2	BBB+	A-2	Glas - 12 mis / Blue - 12 months
National Westminster Bank Ltd	National Westminster Bank Ltd Cash Manager A/c	1,025	Galw/ Call	n/a	0.01	BBB+	F2	A3	P-2	BBB+	A-2	Glas – 12 mis/ Blue – 12 months
Nationwide Building Society	Nationwide Building Society	5,000	Fixed Term	16/08/2016 -16/11/2016	0.28	A	F1	Aa3	P-1	A	A-1	Coch – 6 mis/ Red - 6 months

* Ceir y Rhestr Benthycu Cymeradwyedig yn Atodiad 6 o'r Datganiad Strategaeth Rheoli Trysorlys 2016/17/Strategaeth Buddsoddi Blynyddol/The Approved Lending List can be found at Appendix 6 of the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy Statement / Annual Investment Strategy ** Sef tymor ar pwynt y buddsoddi/Being term at the point of investment.

Approved countries for investments

Based upon lowest available sovereign credit rating

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Luxembourg
- Netherlands
- Norway
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland

AA+

- Finland
- Hong Kong
- U.S.A.

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- Qatar
- U.K.

AA-

- Belgium